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Pay Rates and Subject Performance in Social Science Experiments  
Using Crowdsourced Online Samples1 
 
“Crowdsourcing” samples have emerged as a fast, easy and inexpensive 
source of subjects for experimental research. In particular, Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk has become a popular source for quickly and cheaply recruiting large numbers 
of respondents (Paolacci Et. Al. 2010; Berinsky Et. Al. 2012). “Turkers,” as they are 
known, are a ready alternative to undergraduates or professionally assembled 
samples, and offer two major benefits: their availability (Hitlin, 2016; though also 
see Stewart et. al. 2015) and their inexpensive cost, while still providing a diverse 
pool of subjects (Levay, Freese and Druckman, 2016; Huff and Tingley, 2015; 
Ipeirotis 2010).  
Determining what to pay subjects on Mechanical Turk can be challenging for 
two reasons that may risk the quality of the sample recruited. First, different pay 
rates may attract different participants. Turkers selectively choose which available 
HITs they will accept, making it possible that the selection process may introduce 
sample biases (Krupnikov and Levine 2014). Higher pay rates may attract a 
different type of worker than lower pay rates, either demographically or along some 
other factor that might influence subject performance. Second, paying too little in 
compensation may lead to sub-par subject attention, as participants who decide 
they are not going to be sufficiently compensated alter their performance (Berinsky, 
Margolis and Sances 2016).  
                                                        
1 The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in 
this article are available at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse 




For simple tasks with “right” or “wrong” results that the Requester can 
evaluate, there is an easy mechanism for evaluating subject behavior – rewarding 
accurate behavior through payment and punishing inaccurate behavior by denying 
payment. The Requester simply checks on the work as it is returned to make sure 
that the Worker was indeed paying attention and performing adequately. Turkers 
know this, and behave accordingly.  
As Ho, Slivkins, Suri and Vaughan describe: “even when standard, 
unconditional payments are used and no explicit acceptance criteria is specified, 
workers may behave as if the payments are implicitly performance-based since they 
believe their work may be rejected if its quality is sufficiently low” (Ho et. al. 2013). 
In such scenarios, different pay rates have been demonstrated to motivate workers 
to do a greater quantity of work, but not at higher quality (Mason and Watts 2009). 
Similarly, several studies have shown that, when work is verifiable based upon 
accuracy or correctness, pay rates can influence worker behavior positively (Ho et. 
al. 2013; Horton and Chilton, 2010; Ye, You and Robert, 2017; Finnerty et.al. 2013). 
Social scientists should take pause at this, because all of these studies are 
conditional upon the ability to review subject performance using objective criteria. 
For example, determining if a subject correctly ordered images, or successfully 
identified words among a jumble of letters is relatively easy (Mason and Watts, 
2009).  However, subject performance in social scientific studies tends to lack a 
strong evaluation component. That is, subjects are asked to behave “normally” and 
react to the information and stimuli they are provided as they would in the real 
world, but without the ability of the experimenter to verify that they are indeed 
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doing so. Behaving “normally” does not clearly indicate a “right” or “wrong” set of 
behaviors that can be observed. It is exceedingly difficult to determine if a subject is 
paying attention to an online study (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis, 2010; 
Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016, Berinsky, Margolis and 
Sances 2016), or answering honestly (Rouse 2015; Chandler, Mueller and Paolacci, 
2014) or behaving as they normally would.  
Method 
We identified three areas where payment might affect subject behavior that 
could matter to a researcher: self-selection (who chooses to accept the HIT), 
engagement (how actively subjects paid attention to and interacted with the study), 
and performance (how those subjects reacted to what they saw in the study). Since 
we can identify no correct form of behavior, we simply look to see if different pay 
rates produce different between-subject behavior across a range of measures. If pay 
rates do play an influence, we would expect to see either a linear relationship 
(where higher rates of pay lead to greater attention and performance), or a 
threshold effect (where performance shifts when an “acceptable rate” has been 
reached) on a consistent basis. Thus, we are not seeking a single significant finding, 
but are looking for emerging patterns of behavioral differences that emerge 
between pay groups.   
We conducted two separate studies – one short and easy, the other long and 
difficult – in order to view the effects of different pay rates on performance in 
different styles of social science experiments. The first study was a short survey 
experiment designed in Qualtrics, involving one randomized image followed by 
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thirteen questions.2 The second study was programmed in the Dynamic Process 
Tracing Environment (DPTE) and asked subjects to learn about and vote for political 
candidates. 3 
If pay rates influence subject recruitment and participation, we anticipate 
subjects are likely to perform optimally when their compensation is highest (Ye, You 
and Robert, 2017; Hus, Schmeiser, Haggerty and Nelson 2017). Subjects who feel 
they are being adequately compensated for their work are more likely to pay 
attention, to take seriously the task at hand, and to focus on the decisions they are 
asked to consider. Of course, as the studies progress and subjects spent greater time 
and effort in participating, their attitudes about “being adequately compensated” 
may change.  
Thus, we further suspect that any differences in subject behavior are more 
likely to show up later in the study than earlier. Our first study, which took only 
about 4 minutes to complete, was unlikely to produce differences in behavior 
between the beginning and end of the survey. Our second study however, which 
could take 60 minutes to complete, we believe is more likely to produce effects 
towards the end of the study as subjects tired of participation and may have begun 
reevaluating whether their payment was indeed adequate. 
Results  
                                                        
2 The study can be viewed at: 
https://iastate.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1YxsPYdlywrENi5 
3 A more thorough description of the study can be found in the online appendix. The 





Our results from both studies were roughly identical, in that we found few 
reportable differences in our measures between the different pay rates.4 For brevity, 
and to save space on reproducing dozens of null results, we only present our second 
study here, as it permits the more thorough look at Turker behavior. Matching 
results for the survey experiment can be found in the Online Appendix.  
We first examine if our pay rates affected who we recruited to complete our 
study. We had no a priori assumptions about how pay rates might affect 
recruitment, so we relied on what we considered to be “conventional” demographic 
measures that we use in political science.  
<<<< Insert Table 1 here >>>> 
Table 15 shows that none of our eight categories (percentages of women, 
African-Americans, Hispanics, Democrats, Independents, or the mean age, political 
interest or conservatism of our subjects) return significant results. Further, only one 
of our categories show a consistent pattern in the results (a steady increase in 
Hispanic subjects as pay rates increased).  With a relatively small sample size of 364 
subjects, it is possible that a larger sample size might produce significant results, but 
looking at the substantive differences in results, it seems more likely that our 
                                                        
4 The data, syntax and additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this 
article are avaialbe at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse within 
the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: doi:10.7910/DVN/VCWWGZ  
 
5 Pay rates could also influence how fast subjects accept and complete the study, but 
we found no evidence of this. Every batch we posted completed in approximately 
the same time, but because of the nature of how AMT posts HITs and reports 
completions, it is difficult to analyze more precisely. The lower pay rate groups 
closed slighty slower than the higher pay rate groups, but the substantive difference 
was minimal and seemed to be caused by subjects accepting the HIT and then 
waiting to complete it until the time limit was due.  
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demographic measures tended to show random fluctuation between the pay rates, 
rather than systematic differences in who chose to sign up for the study.  
Our larger concern is for things that we were not able to measure, such as 
Turker experience. It is possible that more experienced Turkers may gravitate 
towards higher pay rates, or studies that they feel have a higher pay-to-effort ratio. 
This is, regrettably, something that we were not able to measure. However, since 
experimental samples don’t tend to seek representative samples on Mechanical 
Turk, we feel that the risk of any demographic or background differences in who we 
recruit is that it could then lead to differences in behavior, either through attention 
to the study or in reaction to the various elements of the study. While we don’t find 
observable demographic differences, we can continue on by examining how people 
performed within the study. 
An advantage of using a DPTE experiment is that we have much greater 
ability to tease out how subjects performed across a range of measures. We first 
present the results of our attention checks, and then will move on to discuss 
engagement with the experiment and candidate evaluation.  
<<<< Insert Table 2 here >>>> 
The vast majority of all of our subjects passed our attention check tests, and 
there are again no significant differences between our pay rate groups.6 There is an 
apparent pattern of subjects passing at higher rates when paid more however, 
which suggests that perhaps there may be an effect that our study was not large 
                                                        
6 Due to a programming glitch, our subjects on the $2 pay day did not see the 
attention check questions, but they did still view our “pop up” attention checks. 
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enough to fully capture.  The lowest rates of passing the first two popups in the 
Primary are found in the $2 pay group (93.8% for both), and while subjects in the 
higher pay groups all passed the third and fourth popup at a 100% rate, subjects in 
our minimal $2 pay group passed this at the lowest rates we find in the study, below 
90%. While not a significant finding, this suggests that perhaps subjects in this 
lowest pay group were not paying attention to the extent of the other pay groups.  
If this is the case, however, further evidence should emerge elsewhere. We 
would expect that attention would get worse as the study carried on. However, it 
does not. These differences do not appear again in the General Election, when we 
expected effects to be the greatest. Overall, we find that our subjects generally 
responded well to our attention checks regardless of what they were being paid. 
<<<< Insert Table 3 here >>>> 
Beyond merely paying attention to what was presented to them, this study 
also asked subjects to actively engage with the program, and actively learn about 
political candidates. This is another area where differential motivation based upon 
pay rates could influence behavior. Table 3 presents a series of one-way analysis-of-
variance tests on measures of active engagement with the experiment. While the 
previous table measured how much attention subjects paid to the study, this table 
assesses how actively engaged Turkers were in interacting with the dynamic 
information boards by selecting information to view. If payments created different 
incentives to participate, this should be observable through the time subjects spent 
in the campaign scenarios, the number of items they chose to view, and how much 
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time they devoted to the political aspects of the study relative to the more 
entertaining current event items.  
We find only one statistically significant result, and thus no consistent or 
clear evidence that pay rates influenced our subject behavior. The lone significant 
finding we have occurs for our measure of the number of information items subjects 
chose to open during the Primary Election. While significant, these results show that 
our highest paid group sought out the most information in the primary, while the 
second highest group sought out the least. This does not sensibly fit to our theory, 
and is not replicated along other measures. The lack of a clear pattern within the 
data again suggests that pay rates did not systematically influence subject 
performance, even in a long and taxing study.  
<<<< Insert Table 4 here >>>> 
A final way for us to consider how our subjects participated in the study is to 
evaluate their final decisions and evaluations of the candidates. It is possible that, 
while behavioral differences did not emerge, perhaps psychological appraisals of the 
subject matter were effected by anticipated rewards. We find, again, very little 
evidence that pay rates mattered. We asked our subjects who they voted for, how 
confident they were in their vote decision, how difficult that vote choice was, and 
how much they felt they knew about the candidates, for both the Executive and 
House race. 
The only significant finding we have in Table 4 is for the confidence our 
subjects had in selecting the House candidate that they truly preferred. Here we find 
a significant result and a pattern indicating that lower-paid subjects had greater 
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confidence in their vote choice. This could lead us to assume that our rates of pay 
influenced how much consideration or psychological investment our subjects had in 
the study. However, this again appears to be an isolated finding. In all other 
measures, there are no significant differences or patterns in the data to find that pay 
rates played a role in how our subjects felt about the candidates or their vote 
decisions.  
Conclusions 
Our results are quite easy to summarize – pay rates did not seem to matter 
much to subject performance among Mechanical Turkers, at least not that we 
observed. While we only discuss our first study here, these results are replicated 
across another shorter study that collected a much larger sample and is presented 
in the Online Appendix. In both studies, no systematic patterns emerged that might 
suggest that pay rates significantly or substantively influenced subject behavior. 
This does not mean, of course, that pay rates produce no effects, but simply that we, 
using two very different social science studies, and observing numerous measures 
of behavior in each, were not able to identify any such effects. We do feel that have 
observed most, if not all, of the important characteristics of behavior likely to 
change.  
Importantly, we report these results without correcting for multiple 
hypothesis testing, which would only further reduce the minimal effects we found. 
In each of our four areas we analyze we have at least 8 different measures, 
suggesting that by chance alone we should find some significant findings. Indeed, we 
do. However, these findings show no clear patterns of the influence of pay rates and 
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it is in the absence of patterns that we feel safest in drawing our conclusions. Our 
clearest path is to conclude that pay rates largely do not influence subject 
participation and behavior on Mechanical Turk.  
This is an important null finding for social scientists using online labor pools. 
However, we do not intend here to conclude fully that pay rates don’t matter. Paying 
a fair wage for work done does still involve ethical standards (Zechmeister 2013). 
While our discipline as a whole has never established what ethical wages are for 
subjects, several suggestions both within the Turker community and academic 
literature have suggested a $6 per hour rate. This still makes crowdsourced samples 
considerably cheaper than professional alternatives, while also paying a fair rate to 







Table 1. Subject Demographics of the DPTE study, by Pay Rate 
 
Pay Rate 







Mean        
Age 




$2 (n=99) 53.6% 4.0% 8.2% 61.2% 15.3% 
35.22    
(1.23) 
2.14          
(0.07) 
3.44   
(0.16) 
$4 (n=96) 46.8% 6.3% 9.6% 68.1% 9.6% 
33.88    
(1.11) 
2.19          
(0.07) 
3.16   
(0.18) 
$6 (n=99) 35.4% 9.1% 14.1% 56.6% 14.1% 
31.87     
(0.97) 
2.17          
(0.07) 
3.33    
(0.17) 
$8 (n=70) 49.3% 5.7% 14.5% 63.8% 17.4% 
32.20   
(1.17) 
1.99           
(0.10) 
3.53    
(0.19) 
Total (n=364) 46.0% 6.3% 11.4% 62.2% 13.9% 
33.37    
(0.57) 
2.13          
(0.04) 
3.35   
(0.09) 
Pearson Chi2 7.101 2.197 2.719 2.834 2.341       





































$2 (n=99) - 93.8% 93.8% 88.2% 85.7% 94.8% 100.0% 94.4% 97.8% 
$4 (n=96) 93.6% 96.8% 98.9% 100.0% 100.0% 97.9% 93.8% 96.2% 93.6% 
$6 (n=99) 94.9% 94.9% 96.0% 100.0% 100.0% 94.9% 100.0% 100.0% 92.5% 
$8 (n=70) 91.2% 95.7% 92.8% 100.0% 100.0% 98.6% 100.0% 97.2% 100.0% 
Total 
(n=364) 
93.5% 95.3% 95.5% 96.0% 94.7% 96.4% 97.9% 97.0% 95.8% 





Table 3. Subject Engagement with the Experiment, by Pay Rate 
 



























































477.78   
(12.94) 






18.65   
(2.60) 













31.78   
(1.72) 



















42.77   
(4.68) 






382.41   
(11.74) 
36.22   
(2.87) 




























































Avg    
Cand 
Pref 
$2 (n=99) 66.0% 
3.804    
(0.109) 
2.289    
(0.129) 
2.938    
(0.073) 
63.9% 
3.897   
(0.113) 
2.289   
(0.139) 




$4 (n=96) 66.7% 
3.776   
(0.114) 
2.277   
(0.126) 
2.920   
(0.069) 
67.7% 
3.702   
(0.119) 
2.351   
(0.126) 




$6 (n=99) 62.6% 
3.816    
(0.115) 
2.010    
(0.107) 
3.040   
(0.075) 
59.6% 
3.612   
(0.104) 
2.141   
(0.098) 




$8 (n=70) 68.1% 
3.427    
(0.138) 
2.318    
(0.150) 
2.862   
(0.088) 
65.2% 
3.368   
(0.145) 
2.603   
(0.144) 







3.728    
(0.059) 
2.214    
(0.063) 
2.947   
(0.038) 
64.0% 
3.667   
(0.060) 
2.324    
(0.062) 




Pearson Chi2  0.635       1.443         
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Determining our pay rates 
To determine what our pay rates would be, we relied upon a general 
convention, in both the Turker community and academic literature, that a “fair” 
wage on Mechanical Turk should equate to approximately $6 per hour. Setting this 
as our “fair hourly rate” we created payments around this of $8 (high rate of pay), $4 
(low rate) and $2 (very low). We have two lower-paying groups because we believe 
that researchers are more likely to err on the side of underpaying samples (and 
concurrently increasing sample size) than overpaying. Additionally, our fears were 
largely of lowly-paid subjects “underperforming” by not paying attention or 
engaging in the study, whereas we have fewer fears of highly paid subject 
“overperforming” somehow.  We pretested our two studies using undergraduate 
research assistants to determine approximate completion times, and generated pay 
rates based upon the estimated time to completion at the hourly rates we specified 
above.  
In the shorter study, we found that participants ranged between 3 and 5 
minutes for completion, and decided to pay subjects either $0.15, $0.30, $0.50, or 
$0.75, equating to roughly a rate of $2.25, $4.50, $7.50 and $11.25 per hour, for a 
subject who took 4 minutes to finish. The second study was longer and had much 
greater variance in completion time, ranging from 40 to 60 minutes, so we decided 
to set a rate of pay estimating the full hour for completion, and simply paid the 




Description of the two studies 
The first experiment examined whether patriotic images influenced feelings 
of patriotism at the national and state level among Americans. It required 
approximately 3 minutes to complete and recruited just over 1000 Turkers. To get a 
nationwide sample, we recruited 4 batches of 100 subjects each simultaneously at 
7:00am, 10:00am, and noon (all times Eastern), paying 15, 30, 50, and 75 cents for 
completion. Each batch featured the same exact description and varied only by the 
amount of compensation offered for completion. The rates of pay were sufficiently 
spaced out that, while the four pay rates were available simultaneously, they 
appeared on different recruitment pages.7  
The first study was a typical survey experiment – we delivered a 13-question 
survey to respondents, but manipulated the image they viewed when they began. 
Our attempt was to provoke feelings of national patriotism, and then ask about the 
balance between respondents national and state-level allegiances. After viewing the 
image, subjects then answered a series of questions about their feelings of national 
patriotism, their state patriotism, and where their balance of feelings leaned. We 
then concluded by asking them to answer a few political knowledge questions about 
their state government.  
                                                        
7 HIT recruitment pages are by default sorted by the rates of pay offered, putting our 
HITs on different screens. Mechanical Turk typically has over 1000 HITs available at 
any given time, ranging from pay rates of $0.01 to nearly $50, spreading these HITs 
out rather widely. Subjects could have sorted HITs by the time of posting which may 
have allowed them to see all four pay rates on the same screen, which is why we use 
a different method in our second study.  
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The second study was much longer and intensive. It took about 45-60 
minutes to complete, and involved a simulated political campaign designed in the 
dynamic process tracing environment (DPTE). In that study we recruited a total of 
about 400 subjects over four consecutive days (100 per day),8 changing the 
payment promised for participation each day. Again, we posted the same HIT 
description on Mechanical Turk, recruiting subjects with a promised payment of $2, 
$4, $6 or $8. We recruited subjects in batches of 25-50 at 7:00am, 10:00am, noon, 
and 2pm until we had 100 complete subjects at each pay rate.9  
The second study asked subjects to learn about political candidates running 
for office and then vote for their preferred candidates, first in a primary election and 
then in a general election.  We anticipated that a more difficult, cognitively-
demanding study would be more likely to elicit behavioral differences from a 
sample responding to varying pay incentives.  In other words, we figured that 
subjects who faced a long, difficult task may become less active, attentive or 
interested as the study progressed and they began to feel insufficiently 
compensated for their efforts. Thus, we employed a rather complex design as a 
tough test of the effect of pay rates, assuming that shorter, simpler studies would 
producer weaker effects.  
                                                        
8 On our fourth day we experienced with a server error resulting in the loss of about 
30 subjects’ data. We see no evidence that this substantively effected our results.  
9 Assessing the effects of pay rates is complicated by the fact that the treatment (pay 
rates) cannot be randomly assigned to participants, because Turkers need to know 
the pay rate before they will accept a HIT. Instead we tried two different 
approaches, first by simultaneously posting 4 identical HITs at different pay rates 
(Study 1), and then by posting identical HITs over the course of 4 days, paying a 
randomizing the rate paid on each day (Study 2). Both methods have weaknesses, 
but together provide a strong basis to analyze the influence of differing pay rates. 
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The second study took between 45-60 minutes to complete, and require 
subjects to actively participate by learning about political candidates running for 
office. Subjects began the study by completing a questionnaire including 
approximately 100 questions, including: 35 political opinions, 11 political 
knowledge questions, 10 personality questions, 7 political participation questions, 
24 feeling thermometer evaluations of political candidates and groups, and 9 
demographic questions. Within these questions were 4 “attention check” questions 
– simple questions that tracked whether subjects were paying attention to what 
they were shown or just randomly clicking an answer (See Berinsky, Markolis and 
Sances 2016).  
Subjects then proceeded to a short 2-minute long mock presidential 
campaign that taught them how the dynamic process tracing software operated. 
After completing that training, they were introduced to two Democrats and two 
Republicans running their party’s nomination for an executive office,10 and asked to 
choose in which primary they would vote. They then viewed a 17-minute long 
dynamic information board and cast their primary vote (see Lau and Redlawsk 2006 
for a fuller explanation of the system). After 7 minutes, subjects were able to choose 
to leave the dynamic information board and proceed directly to the “ballot box” to 
vote.  
After the primary, subjects found out which candidates won and saw those 
candidates advance to the general election, where they were joined by candidates 
                                                        
10 Half the sample saw the candidates as gubernatorial candidates, and half saw 
them appear as presidential candidates. The candidates were identical in all ways 
other than the office they sought.  
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running for US Senate and the House of Representatives. Another 17-minute 
dynamic information board followed, after which subjects were asked to vote and 
evaluate the candidates they learned about. In total, subjects were able to learn up 
to 25 unique attributes about each candidate.   
Alongside this candidate information, we included 25 current event items 
that were not politically relevant, but were designed to be interesting and distract 
attention away from the campaign material.  Also, within both dynamic information 
boards were additional attention checks – pop up boxes that asked subjects to close 
the box within 10 seconds. In total, the dynamic information boards presented much 
more information than a person could possibly access, process and use in a single 
session. In such a setting, we expect than any differences caused by pay rates should 
become clearly observable.  
 
Results of the Survey Experiment of Patriotism 
 Our first study was a survey experiment asking American citizens about how 
they felt about their state and nation. Subjects first viewed a randomly selected 
picture designed to elicit varying levels of national patriotism: a picture of Grand 
Central station (which to most observers unfamiliar with New York City looked 
simply like a large atrium with people walking through it), that identical image with 
a small digitally-inserted American flag in plain view, or a large image of the 
American flag. Subjects then were asked about how much they agreed with 
statements about being proud of the United States, the United States being the 
greatest nation in the world, and whether people born abroad could ever truly 
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understand what it is to be an American. Subjects also were asked how long they 
have been a citizen of the United States. Next, subjects were queried about what 
state they lived in, and the previous questions were then repeated for their state. 
Subjects were then asked the “Moreno” question about whether they felt they were 
more a citizen of their country or of their state.11 Finally, subjects were asked about 
their age, sex, partisanship and some political knowledge questions about their 
state’s government. This provides several measures of who signed up at each pay 
rate, and how they participated within the study generally. 
The first area where pay rates may have influenced participation in our 
studies was in self-selection of subjects choosing to accept and complete the HIT. 
We included only a few demographic questions in the first study, as we wanted to 
keep it as short as possible and we had no a priori reason to suppose demographic 
differences in the sample. What we found suggests little influence of pay rates upon 
sample composition.  
<<<< Insert Table 1 here >>>> 
 We found no significant differences in the composition of our sample based 
upon age, sex or partisanship (although there is a consistent, though not significant, 
trend of fewer women as pay rates got higher). It is possible that the lack of 
differences found here was caused by these questions appearing at the end of the 
study, rather than at the beginning. It could be that the pay rate groups began 
                                                        
11 The question was developed by social scientist Luis Moreno in 1986 in studying 
Scottish identity, but has been explored further in recent work, by among others 
McCrone and Bechhofer 2015.  The question asks respondents to choose how salient 




demographically imbalanced, but only those subjects who felt adequately 
compensated successfully completed the study, and that it is only the reduced 
sample that showed no demographic differences. However, we have no evidence of 
this and find no reason to suspect this was the case. As a check, in our second study 
we placed the demographic questions at the beginning of the study.  
<<<< Insert Table 2 here >>>> 
A second area where subjects could have demonstrated pay-based 
differences was in their participation in the study. We specifically look at how many 
subjects in each pay group completed the study, how long they spent in the study 
(an indication of their attention), how many of the political knowledge questions 
they correctly answered, and how much time they spent answering those questions 
(measures of their effort in answering correctly). Along three of these measures 
(total time, time spent on political knowledge questions, and number of correct 
answers), subjects in the various pay groups exhibited no significant differences.  
The only area we found significant differences based upon our rate of 
payment was in the completion rate of subjects.12 Only about 70% of subjects who 
signed in from the lowest payment group (15 cents) completed the study, while 
approximately 85% of the highest paid subjects successfully completed the study. 
The two middle payment groups had completion rates around 80%. This data comes 
from the Qualtrics survey, which could only be accessed by Turkers who had 
                                                        
12 With this number of dependent variables, it would be appropriate to correct our 
results for multiple hypothesis testing. However, given the pattern of a lack of 
results throughout our analysis, we are confident in our assertion that there are no 
effects and include the Holms corrections in the Online Appendix. 
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accepted the HIT. Since we only paid those who completed the HIT and returned the 
correct completion code, this means that some Turkers started the HIT and 
abandoned it, allowing others to then accept the HIT and complete it.  
This suggests that subjects who feel underpaid may simply end their 
participation outright, rather than remaining in the study with inattentive 
performance. While this is not ideal, it is the better of the alternatives and seems to 
be a sort of self-selection of providing missing data from subjects who feel they are 
not being sufficiently compensated.  
 Table 1 and 2 demonstrate that pay rates in the survey experiment did not 
seem to effect who accepted the HIT or how they performed during the study. We 
can also examine how subjects answered the subjective questions in the study for 
any discrepancies there. While we have no theoretical reasons to believe that people 
accepting different compensation would differ across our measures, it is possible 
that people who feel differently about their compensation during the study might 
answer differently based upon their attention to or consideration of the questions. 
Subjects who feel undercompensated may simply speed through the questions, 
clicking arbitrarily without reference to the subject matter. If this were the case, we 
would expect this to occur primarily in the lower paid conditions, and less so in the 
higher paid conditions. We find no evidence of this however.  
<<<< Insert Table 3 here >>>> 
 Table 3 presents the mean scores for the national and state level variable 
patriotism questions in our study, including the duration of residence question. Our 
four pay groups were statistically indistinguishable based upon their declared 
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feelings of pride in, the greatness of, and the difficulty of being a full citizen in both 
the nation and their state. They also did not differ on the balance they felt between 
their national and state citizenship, which tilted towards greater feelings of national 
citizenship. In all, we find remarkably few differences across a range of measures in 
this study, and can only conclude that pay rates have very little influence on subject 
behavior in survey experiments.     
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Online Table 3. Subject Responses in the Survey Experiment, by Pay Rate 
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F Stat  0.699 1.609 1.025 0.385 0.646 0.752 0.586 
 
 
